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Effect  of Contract Disclosure  on Price:
Railroad Grain Contracting
in the Plains
Stephen W.  Fuller, Fred J. Ruppel, and David A.  Bessler
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 granted railroads freedom to establish  rates and enter
into confidential contracts with grain shippers. Recent legislation (1986) required  that
certain contract terms be disclosed.  This study shows rail rates in the Plains region
commenced  an upward trend after implementation  of the disclosure policy. Results
suggest contract disclosure and increased reliance on posted tariffs facilitated rate
coordination within the oligopolistic railroad industry.
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Railroads  were  granted freedom  to establish
rates  and enter  into  contracts  with shippers/
receivers by the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. This
act reversed  nearly  a  century  of prohibiting
private contracting.1 Contracts have been used
extensively to specify grain rates and services
during the post-Staggers  period.  Typically,  a
grain contract commits a grain shipper to some
minimum shipment size and volume while the
railroad provides transportation service at be-
low-tariff levels.  Small  shippers  often  find  it
difficult to meet volume and shipment size re-
quirements  of contracts  offered to large  ship-
pers. By the early 1980s many small grain ship-
pers believed they were disadvantaged by the
more favorable  contract rates  offered by rail-
roads to large grain shippers.  In view of this
alleged discrimination,  Congress enacted Pub-
lic  Law 99-509  (21  October  1986)  which re-
quired  disclosure  of essential  grain  contract
terms.
The purpose of this study is to identify the
effect of contract  disclosure  on railroad grain
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' The Railroad  Revitalization  and Regulatory  Reform  Act of
1976 permitted  contracting but several unanswered  concerns  re-
sulted in little contracting.  It was not until passage of the Staggers
Rail Act in 1980 that contracting became widespread.
rate  levels in  the  South  and  Central  Plains.
Some  grain  shippers,  often  the  larger  firms,
hold  that contract  disclosure  discourages  in-
terrail  competition  since  railroads know pre-
cisely the prices against which they must com-
pete  in  order  to  acquire  traffic  (Milling and
Baking News).  Post-Staggers  studies have
shown that deregulation led to significant rate
reductions  in  the  Central  and  South  Plains
(Klindworth et al.). Some believe this outcome
partially  was  facilitated by  confidentiality  of
rail contracts  (Babcock  et  al.;  Fuller  et  al.).
Further, some argue that contracting promotes
efficiency by allowing railroads to plan the de-
ployment of equipment and personnel  [Asso-
ciation  of American  Railroads  (AAR)  1989].
Thus, disclosure of contract terms may threat-
en both interrail competition and the efficiency
fostered  by  deregulation,  thereby  creating  a
force to increase railroad grain rates.
MacDonald  (1989)  offers  an  excellent  syn-
thesis  of  pre-  and  post-deregulation  impact
studies. Prior to deregulation, research by Bab-
cock;  Fuller,  Makus,  and Taylor;  and  Soren-
son,  Anderson,  and Nelson  suggested  dereg-
ulation would not lead to general rate increases
in the Plains because  regulated rates  were  as
high as intermodal competition would permit,
i.e.,  railroads  would  lose  substantial  market
share  to trucks  and  barges  if rail rates  were
increased above the regulated levels.  Post-de-
regulation studies show rail rates in the South
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and  Central  Plains  declined  about  one-third
by the 1985-86 period (Babcock et al.; Chow;
Fuller et al.). They hold that rivalries in pricing
behavior  among railroads  were  facilitated  by
contracting  and  the removal  of rate bureaus
from antitrust immunity. After accounting for
changes in transportation demands, costs, and
a shift in shipment size, it was concluded that
rate  changes  since  deregulation  have resulted
in new  and effective  interrail  competition  in
the South and Central  Plains' grain transpor-
tation market (Fuller et al.; MacDonald  1989).
Neoclassical  economic  theory  offers  little
definitive insight on the likely effect of contract
disclosure.  In those situations where the effect
of a subtle change in market organization can-
not be deduced through formal economic log-
ic, experimental economics is increasingly em-
ployed. Hong and Plott employed the methods
of experimental  economics to  examine a sit-
uation which  has similarities to the rail con-
tract disclosure issue, thus offering an expecta-
tion about its potential effect.  They  explored
the consequences  of a proposed rate publica-
tion policy for the barge industry operating on
the domestic inland waterways.  The proposed
posted rate  organization  was  contrasted  with
the existing organization  which involved pri-
vately negotiated prices.  Hong and Plott con-
cluded that posting rate changes would lead to
higher  prices  and  reduced  market  efficiency.
This finding suggests rail rates may increase if
price  information  from  privately  negotiated
contracts between grain shippers and railroads
is disclosed. Coincidentally,  this outcome sup-
ports the  grain shippers'  view that disclosure
would discourage interrail competition. When
rail rates  are  disclosed,  there may be  an  op-
portunity for the  oligopolistic rail industry to
coordinate prices,  and in a market where the
demand for transportation service is inelastic,
there is an incentive for a price leader to evolve
and adjust rates  upward.2 This  suggests  con-
tract disclosure,  the focus of this study,  may
induce an upward movement in rail rates. In
contrast, without contract disclosure rivalrous
2 Wilson showed that the elasticity of demand for transport ser-
vice can be estimated from product  supply elasticity,  product de-
mand elasticity, price of transport service linking two regions, and
product price in the  destination market.  Based on  values which
were believed representative of the South and Central Plains, the
elasticity of demand for wheat transportation service was estimated
to be very low, generally smaller than  -.07 for the  study region.
It follows  that carriers  have an  incentive to adjust rates  upward
as a result of the very inelastic demand.
pricing behavior is precipitated since railroads
do not know the price against which they must
compete.
Background
Contract disclosure rules established by the In-
terstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in Jan-
uary  1987 require contracting parties to make
public  the following  information:  (a)  carrier
name(s);  (b) commodity;  (c)  shipper  identity;
(d)  specific origins, destinations, transit points
and involved shipper facilities; (e) contract du-
ration;  (f)  rail  car  usage;  (g) base  rates  and
charges;  (h)  volume;  and  (i)  special  features
relating to transit time, credit terms, discounts,
etc.  A second-tier  disclosure  process is avail-
able  to  aggrieved  parties  who  require  addi-
tional contract information. If a party can prove
itself to be an "affected  party," the additional
contract information  may be made  available
(ICC  1987).
During the first three years of deregulation
(1980-83),  1,344 grain contracts were written.
In 1984,  1985,  and 1986, the number of grain
contracts written increased to 1,217; 2,770; and
2,935,  respectively.  After  issuing  disclosure
rules in January  1987, written contract num-
bers declined to  2,148 in  1987  and to  1,625
in 1988. It is estimated that in  1986, the year
prior to the ICC's  issuance  of the disclosure
rules,  63%  of all  rail-transported  grain  was
contracted, whereas in 1988 about 40% of rail-
transported  grain  moved  under  a  contract
(AAR  1988e).  The  AAR  maintains  that the
disclosure  requirement  reduced  contracting
since  firms  believed  proprietary  information
would be disclosed (AAR  1988c).3
This study focuses on the rail transportation
market  for  wheat  in  the  South  and  Central
Plains, a region including Kansas, Oklahoma,
and  Texas.  The  area  is a  major producer  of
hard red winter wheat.  Because the  region is
landlocked  and must ship extended distances
to reach its principal markets, railroad carriage
dominates. It is estimated that over half of the
wheat production in the region goes to the ex-
3  In  1989  the  U.S.  Court  of Appeals  for  the  Seventh  Circuit
upheld the Interstate  Commerce Commission's  rejection of a pe-
tition by the Western Fuels Association  seeking disclosure of con-
fidential rail coal contract terms. Opponents pointed out that con-
tract disclosure  could be  a  deterrent  to  the  negotiation  of new
contracts.
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port market with over 95%  exiting via Texas
ports. A 1985 survey of grain export firms op-
erating on the Texas Gulf showed  93%  of re-
ceipts  from  this  region  are  rail-transported
(North  Central  Regional  Project  137).  There
are  10 Class I railroads operating in the region,
six of which link the region with Texas ports.
Based on the ICC's Rail Waybill Sample Mas-
ter File for 1984,  three rail carriers  assemble
nearly 90% of all export grain to Texas ports.
Conceptual  Approach, Model,  and Data
The  demand  for grain  transportation  is  de-
rived from the demand  for the study region's
grain in destination markets (Dy) and farm lev-
el  supply  of grain  (S7)  (Wilson).  These  two




Dd  = Dd(P,  D,  Ed)
S  = S(P-  _  ,  ,  E  ),
where pw refers to the price of grain and D and
S are  vectors  of exogenous  shifters.  The  de-
rived demand for grain transportation service
(Dt) is the vertical distance between these two
functions:
(3)  D, = D  S  - S  D,  =  D,(Pw, Pt,  D, S,  Edf),
where  Edf  is  the  combined  error  term  from
equations  (1) and  (2).  The  supply  of grain
transportation  service  (St) is a function  of the
price of transportation  service  (Pt)  and also is
affected by a number of exogenous shifters (Z):
(4) St  =  S(P,,  Z  Est).
Equating the demand for and supply of trans-
portation service and solving for Pt results in
the following reduced-form  equation:
(5)  Pt = Pt(Pw, Pt  -,  AD,  S, Z, Ep).
Clearly a number of forces impact  on the re-
gion's average railroad rate level, thus the need
to control  for their influences  when  isolating
the effect of the implemented disclosure policy
on  study region  rates.  In the  short  run  one
would expect determinants of the variables on
the right-hand side of the reduced-form  equa-
tion to be predetermined so that ordinary least
squares,  applied to a linearized version of the
equation,  would  provide  unbiased  estimates
(at least over ranges of historical data).
The adopted procedure involves estimating
a regression  equation with railroad rate as the
dependent variable.  Because railroad rates are
for individual hauls, there is a need to include
shipment  characteristics  (distance,  etc.)  and
competition  as independent  variables as  well
as:  (a) controls  for the above-noted  demand
and supply schedules; (b) a time trend, season,
and region/state  dummies;  and (c)  a  0-1  dis-
closure  policy variable  and  associated  inter-
action terms to identify any change in rate level
that results from initiation of the contract dis-
closure policy.  The region/state  dummies  at-
tempt  to control  for  cross-region  rate deter-
minants  not  formally  incorporated  into  the
model,  while season dummies are included to
capture  any seasonal  variation  in rates.  The
time-trend variable captures the trend in rates
after  controlling  for  changing  demands,  sup-
plies,  and shipment characteristics,  and when
interacted  with the 0-1  policy variable,  yields
a term whose  coefficient  measures  rate trend
after initiation of the disclosure policy in Jan-
uary  1987.  Historic  grain  flow  studies  show
the study region's rail industry has little inter-
modal competition,  thus a competition  vari-
able is not included.
The following  logarithmic  form for the re-
gression equation was specified:
ln(RTM)
=  ao + aln(HRDM) + a21n(HRS) + a3ln(RS)
+ a1n(RC) + a1n(RU) + a61n(MILE)
+ aln(SHSZ) + a81n(TON) + a,(Q,)
+  alO(Q2) +  all(Q3) +  a 1 2(KN)
+ al3(TX+  a  a 4(TR) + a,,(DP)
+ al6(TRDP) + al7(KNTRDP)
+ a18(TXTRDP) +  U.
The rate or price measure, RTM (revenue per
ton-mile),  is  obtained from  the ICC's  Public
Use  Waybill  Files for  1983-88  (MacDonald
1987).4 Waybill  files  are  a stratified  random
sample  of all  nonproprietary  wheat traffic  in
Kansas,  Oklahoma,  and  Texas  and  include
15,586  observations  (ICC  1983-88).  Associ-
ated with each rate  are the short-line miles of
haul (MILE), number  of cars in the sampled
shipment (SHSZ), average number of tons per
car in the  sampled  shipment  (TON),  region/
state where the haul originated (KN,  OK, TX),
4 MacDonald  (1987)  compared  tariff and  Waybill rate  files  to
determine  whether Waybill files included contract  rates. He  con-
cluded that Waybill files do  include contract  rates since they are
substantially below the published  tariff for identical hauls.
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Table  1.  Variable Identification, Description,  and Descriptive  Statistics
Variable
Identifi-  Standard
cation  Description  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Deviation
RTM  Revenue  per ton-mile,  1983-88  $/ton-mile  0.0382  3.3227  0.00001  0.0773
HRDM  Monthly hard red winter wheat exports,  1983-88,  51,589.9  113,266.0  19,129.0  22,857.1
1,000 bu.
HRS  Annual hard winter  wheat production and carry-  1,909.06  2,027.0  1,447.0  86.1
over,  1983-86,  1,000,000 bu.
RS  Capacity of rail grain fleet,  1983-88,  1,000,000  816.95  823.5  809.30  5.19
bu.
RC  Quarterly index of railroad materials,  fuel and la-  193.27  208.4  176.1  8.19
bor costs (1977  =  100)
RU  Ratio of rail grain traffic by quarter to rail grain  1.4  1.81  1.07  0.22
fleet capacity (RS)
MILE  Short-line miles associated  with Waybill  sample  380.63  3,200.0  5.00  315.99
rail data
SHSZ  Number of railroad cars associated with Waybill  17.35  230.0  1.00  30.51
sample shipment
TON  Average  tons per car associated  with Waybill  97.28  113.0  3.85  14.11
sample rail data
Ql,  Q 2, Q 3 Seasonal dummy variables  for first, second, and
third quarters
TR  A yearly time trend,  0 =  1983,  1 =  1984,  2 =
1985,  3=  1986, 4  =  1987,  5  =  1988
KN  0-1  variable, Kansas  origins
TX  0-1  variable, Texas origins
DP  0-1  variable, contract  disclosure  1983-86 =  0,
1987-88  = 1
TRDP  0-1  variable, interaction between  TR and DP
KNTRDP  0-1  variable, interaction between  KN, TR,  and
DP
TXTRDP  0-1 variable,  interaction between  TX, TR,  and
DP
and the day, month, and year of shipment (ta-
ble  1). It is hypothesized that the miles of haul
(MILE), shipment size (SHSZ),  and tons  per
car  (TON) variables are  negatively  related to
revenue  per ton-mile  (RTM). 5
The  demand  for  hard  red  winter  wheat
(HRDM),  supply  of hard  red  winter  wheat
(HRS), and supply  of rail transportation  ser-
vice (RS) are included to control for their effect
on rate (table 1).  The wheat demand and sup-
ply variables  are expected to be positively re-
lated  to rate (RTM),  while rail supply would
be negatively  related to RTM. Monthly hard
red winter wheat exports are included as a proxy
for wheat demand (HRDM) [U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA), Grain and Feed Mar-
ket  News].  Changes  in  the  demand  for  rail
transportation service are primarily associated
5 Costs of switching,  classification,  and  documentation as well
as some line haul costs do not increase proportionately with mile-
age.  As a result, costs  and rates  per mile are expected  to decline
with  distance.
with changing export demands since domestic
demands are relatively constant over time, thus
the choice of the export variable. Annual hard
red  winter  wheat  production  and  carryover
represent the wheat supply variable (HRS) in
the specified  model (USDA,  Wheat Situation
and Outlook).
The capacity of the railroad industry's grain
fleet is published annually in The Grain  Book
(AAR  1988e)  and  is  taken  as  a measure  of
railroad supply (RS), while the AAR's month-
ly index of railroad costs (RC) serves as a sup-
ply shifter (AAR, Railroad  Cost Indexes).6 Be-
cause a large portion of railroad costs are fixed,
the utilization of grain carrying  capacity may
have a favorable impact on costs and rates. To
capture  this potential  effect,  a ratio  variable
(RU) is calculated  which  includes  rail-trans-
6 The rail cost variable  (RC) is  highly correlated  with per-mile
motor carrier  costs. Thus, it also may be viewed as a measure of
truck competition.
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ported grain shipments  per month as the nu-
merator and grain carrying capacity of the rail
fleet  as  the  denominator.  It  is  hypothesized
that railroad  supply (RS), railroad cost (RC),
and utilization of railroad capacity (R U) vari-
ables will  influence rates  negatively.  To cap-
ture any seasonal variation in rates, quarterly
dummies  (Q1,  Q2,  Q3) are incorporated  in the
specified  model.
The annual trend variable (TR) will provide
information  on  study-region  railroad  rate
trends  after controlling  for the above-identi-
fied exogenous variables.  Earlier studies show
study-region  rates  trend  downward  over  the
1981 through 1986 period, thus a negative sign
is expected on this variable.7 To measure  the
impact of contract disclosure, a 0-1 disclosure
policy  variable  is  included.  All  observations
in the 1983-86 period are assigned a zero and
those in 1987 and 1988 are assigned a one. In
January 1987 contract disclosure was initiated.
Of course,  the  use  of a dummy  variable  to
capture the effects  of the  change in policy  re-
quires that one  recognize  that other  uniden-
tified "causal" factors which are coincident with
the policy  change  are candidates  for affecting
the  observed  result  on  rates  (Campbell  and
Stanley).  The  authors  know  of no  such vari-
ables.  An  interaction  term  (TRDP) between
TR and DP  measures the rate trend in the post-
disclosure  period. If the estimated  coefficient
on  TRDP is positive and larger than the  an-
ticipated negative coefficient on TR, the study-
region rate trend will have been reversed. The
unique  effect  of contract  disclosure  on  rate
trends in each state within the study region is
measured  by  interacting  the  state  dummies
(KN,  TX) with the TRDP variable to yield the
KNTRDP and  TXTRDP variables.
Results  and Implications
The coefficients  and associated  t-statistics for
the estimated  regression  equation  are  shown
in table  2.  The  adjusted R2 is  .7148  and the
7 We are referring to the trend of rail rates in the Great Plains.
Presumably, there also may be underlying trends in either the farm
level supply  or the total demand  for grain from the region  which
would  affect  rail rates  through their  impact  on  the  demand for
transportation  services. However,  our perusal of wheat  data for
the  1983-88 period  revealed no discernable  trends in either U.S.
or  worldwide  wheat  prices  or  wheat  quantities  produced,  con-
sumed, or traded. If there is any trend in the supply of transpor-
tation service, we would expect it to be in the direction of excess
capacity, furthering the decline in rail rates.
Table  2.  Estimated  Regression
for Plains Rail Rate Equationa
Coefficients
Variable  Coefficient  t-Ratio
Constant  -18.5091  -1.150
HRDAM*  0.0581  4.588
HRS  0.0551  0.412
RS  1.6559  0.720
RC*  1.4767  4.507
RU*  -0.4251  -7.132
MILE*  -0.6269  -125.041
SHSZ*  -0.1842  -57.677
TON*  -0.1183  -5.987
Ql  -0.0076  -0.405
Q2*  0.0427  2.956
Q3*  0.0755  5.514
TR*  -0.0551  -6.806
KN  -0.0140  -1.046
TX*  -0.1936  11.905
DP*  -0.8073  -9.597
TRDP*  0.1668  9.308
KNTRDP*  -0.01627  -4.102
TXTRDP*  -0.01655  3.471
Adj. R
2 =  .7148
N= 15,586
Durbin-Watson =  1.85
a All continuous  variables are in natural  logarithms.
*  Statistically significant at the .01  level.
Note: For explanation of variables, see table 1.
Durbin-Watson  statistic  indicates  no  serial
correlation.  All  continuous  variables  are sig-
nificant at the  .01  level  except HRS and RS.
Distance of haul (MILE) is negative, large, and
highly significant with a t-ratio of-  125.0. Since
the  estimated  coefficients  on  all  continuous
variables  are  elasticities,  increasing  miles  of
haul (MILE) by  1% lowers the ton-mile  rate
by .63%.  The  number of cars in  a shipment
(SHSZ) and mean tons per car in a shipment
(TON) also have important impacts  on rates,
with estimated elasticities of -. 18 and  -. 12,
respectively. Monthly exports of hard red win-
ter wheat (HRDM) are positive and significant
but relatively small. A 1%  increase in monthly
wheat exports leads to only an estimated .06%
increase in rates. Railroad costs (RC) also have
a positive and significant  effect  on rates. Nei-
ther the wheat (HRS) nor railroad (RS) supply
variables  are significant.
The coefficient on the trend variable (TR) is
negative and highly significant indicating that
rates trend downward in the study region be-
tween 1983 and 1986. After controlling for the
identified exogenous variables, rates decreased
about  5% per  year  or  20%  during  1983-86.
This closely parallels the findings of Babcock
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et al.;  Chow;  and Fuller et al.  who  measured
about  a  33% rate  decline  in the study  region
during 1981-86. Further, rail rate trends in the
post-disclosure  era  (TRDP) are  positive  and
highly significant  as are the interaction  terms
which measure rate trends peculiar to any state
in the study region. Based on these coefficients
the annual  upward trend in rail rates in Kan-
sas,  Oklahoma,  and  Texas  was  about  10%,
11.8%, and 13.7% per year, respectively.8 Thus,
the downward trend in study-region rates has
been reversed  and  the  reversal  is  coincident
with the initiated disclosure policy. 9 This ob-
servation comes after controlling for the iden-
tified  exogenous  forces  which  generally were
found to have the expected impact on rates.
Some  argue  that the upward  rate  trend  in
1987  and  1988  was  the result of an increase
in the demand for grain transportation service
(AAR 1988d).  They reinforce their contention
by noting average monthly exports of hard red
winter  wheat  increased  from  30.5  million
bushels in 1986 to 46.5 and 50.6 million bush-
els in 1987 and  1988, respectively.  In spite of
the substantial increase in exports, the results
of this study do not support their contention.
This study found export volume to be highly
significant but to have a small direct effect on
wheat rates. The elasticity of rates with respect
to export volume was about .06, in which case
the 53% increase in monthly shipments (1986
versus  1987) would have adjusted rates by less
than  4%. 10 The effect of increased export de-
mand is too small to account for the observed
increase in rates.
A  shift  toward  multicar  shipments  in  the
post-Staggers  era is often cited as a partial ex-
planation  for the observed  rate decline in the
1981-86 period (MacDonald 1989). A reversal
of this trend could explain the recent  upward
rate trend, but, in fact, the average number of
cars  per  shipment  (SHSZ) in  1987-88  was
about 21, the highest recorded  during the six-
8  A telephone  survey (May  1988) of seven shippers in the pan-
handle  of Texas and western  Oklahoma showed  export  rates in-
creased an average of 17.6% in the first  15 months following ini-
tiation of the disclosure  policy in January  1987.
9  This result is based on the presumption that our trend variable
(TR)  only captures trends in railroad rates. If the trend variable
should incorporate  any  other trends that may be included in the
structural  equations,  these results must be reinterpreted (see foot-
note 7).
10  Fuller et al. found the elasticity of the export price spread with
respect to export volume ranged between  .06 and .07 in the study
region,  an  estimate  virtually  identical  with  the elasticity  of rate
with respect to export volume estimated by this study.
year  study period.  Thus, the  increased  ship-
ment size in 1987-88 offers no explanation for
the measured trend. Nor does  average length
of haul (MILE), tons per car (TON), railroad
costs  (RC),  or  any other  exogenous  variable
account for the observed trend in rates in 1987-
88.  Further,  railroads  should have been  able
to retain  efficiencies  associated  with planning
the deployment  of personnel  and  equipment
since major carriers in the study region intro-
duced reservation programs after the reduced
use of contracts  (AAR  1988a).1 1
The  Staggers  Act fostered interrail  compe-
tition through the abolition of rate bureaus and
reduced reliance on the posted tariff schedules.
The AAR maintains the implemented disclo-
sure policy reduced grain contracting, thus in-
creasing dependence on posted tariffs. This re-
search  suggests  that  contract  disclosure  and
increased use of tariffs facilitated rate coordi-
nation  and  the  subsequent  upward  trend  in
rates.  This  was  possible  in the  study  region
because of  ineffective intermodal competition.
In those  regions  where  railroads  and  barges
compete  for grain traffic (Corn  Belt), there is
less  reason  to  expect  the  upward  rate  trend
observed in the Plains.
Summary and Conclusions
Legislation in the fall of 1986 required the ICC
to broaden disclosure of terms of contracts be-
tween agricultural  shippers/receivers  and rail-
roads. Rules were issued in January  1987 that
forced disclosure  of most contract terms.  Pre-
viously, nearly all terms were confidential. The
purpose of  this study was to determine whether
contract disclosure affected railroad grain rate
levels in the South and Central  Plains.
A regression equation was estimated which
included rail rates  as the  dependent variable
and a variety of independent variables  which
controlled for shifts in transportation demand
and supply, shipment characteristics and ship-
ping region, as well as a 0-1 disclosure variable
and interaction  terms to measure  rate trends
in the  pre- and  post-disclosure  periods. Rate
data were obtained from the ICC's Public Use
l  Since legislation mandating grain contract  disclosure was im-
plemented, the Burlington Northern and Union Pacific introduced
forward  arrangements  and  similar  specialized  reservation  pro-
grams to facilitate improved scheduling of equipment and person-
nel. These programs were initiated in early  1988.
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Waybill Files for 1983-88. The estimated  co-
efficients  showed  study-region  rates  trended
downward through  1986, a finding supported
by earlier research.  However, coincident  with
the implemented  disclosure  in January  1987
was  a strong and significant  upward trend  in
rates. Based on the estimated coefficients, rates
in Kansas, Oklahoma,  and Texas increased at
an annual rate of about 10%, 11.8%, and 13.7%,
respectively.  The  reversal  in rates  was  mea-
sured after controlling for the effect of exoge-
nous forces.
This study  suggests that contract disclosure
and the increased reliance on posted tariffs fa-
cilitated rate coordination by the oligopolistic
railroad  industry,  thereby  leading  to  an  in-
crease in rail rates. This finding supports those
of Hong and Plott who investigated the effect
of rate disclosure  on rate levels  of the inland
barge industry.  In addition,  this finding  sup-
ports the argument of grain shippers who con-
tend  that  contract  disclosure  discourages
interrail  competition.  The  implemented  dis-
closure  policy represents  a  return to  shipper
rate equalization,  a regulatory  philosophy  of
the pre-Staggers  era.
[Received March 1990; final revision
received August 1990.]
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